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Summary
In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the
past 50 years,” it is  redesigning its current 10 active duty division force to a 42 or 43
brigade combat team (BCT) force by FY2007.  The Army National Guard and Army
Reserves will also redesign their forces  in a similar fashion.  The planned addition
of active duty brigades and the conversion of  Army National Guard brigades could
provide a larger force pool of deployable combat units to ease the burden on units
presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed
on operations. The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway that it
considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign:  rebalancing to create
new “high demand” units;  stabilizing the force to foster unit cohesion and enhance
predictability for soldiers and their families; and cyclical readiness to better manage
resources and to ensure a ready force for operations.  These  initiatives involve
substantial cultural, policy, organizational, and personnel changes.
Some experts believe that modular redesign, selective rebalancing,  stabilizing,
and cyclical readiness are prudent actions that should provide the Army with
additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their
families.  As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise,
many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and
reserve forces. As the Army continues its modular conversion, it may have to contend
with budget, personnel, and equipment shortages which could impede plans to build
this new force as intended.  Some  also question if the Army can afford both its
Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program.
Rebalancing and stabilization efforts are currently underway but it is difficult
to gauge their impact on the modularization process.  Based on  DOD’s Global
Basing Strategy and 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions, the
Army has established a stationing plan for its modular forces.  The Army also plans
to begin its cyclical readiness program in FY2006. With significant budgetary issues,
and personnel and equipment shortages impacting on the Army’s plans to convert the
entire Army into the Army Modular Force (AMF), the second session of the 109th
Congress might decide to examine these and other concerns in greater detail.  This
report will be updated.
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1 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers
and a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.
U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:
Issues for Congress 
Issues For Congress
The United States Army is involved in a total organizational redesign of its
combat and support units to better meet current and future operational requirements.
This redesign effort, as well as associated rebalancing, stabilization, and cyclical
readiness initiatives are deemed important by proponents as they are intended to
sustain both the active and reserve Army through a potentially long term, manpower
and resource intensive war on terror. 
The overall issue facing Congress is how well the Army’s modularity program is
progressing and what are some of the issues affecting this major redesign effort. Also of
critical importance is the Army’s ability to fund both the Future Combat System (FCS)
program and its modularity program concurrently.  Key potential oversight questions for
the second session of the 109th Congress can be summarized as follows: 
! How many modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) does the Army
plan on fielding and what are the risks associated with activating
fewer BCTs than originally planned?
! What lessons have been learned by Army modular units in Iraq and
Afghanistan that could affect the modularization of the rest of the Army?
! What are the specific modularity-related personnel and equipment
shortages facing the Army?
! Does the Army’s current modular force design adequately address
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations? 
! How are the Army’s rebalancing,  stabilization, and cyclical
readiness efforts progressing and what are their associated costs?
The 109th Congress’s decisions on these and other related issues could have
significant implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and
future congressional oversight activities.  This report addresses the U.S. Army’s
redesign of  its current force structure, based on large divisions, into one based on
smaller brigade-level modular BCTs.1
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2 Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2005, Jan. 15, 2005, p. 9. In addition the Army Staff
Operations Division (G-3) and associated staff elements have provided comments on the




What the Army Intends to Achieve by Modularization
The Army maintains that by organizing  around BCTs and Support Brigades, it
will be able to “better meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment
and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).”2
Accordingly, the Army hopes that modularization will result in:
! At least a 30% increase in the combat power of the Active
Component of the force;
! An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%;
! Army operating forces that require less augmentation when deployed
— reducing the requirement for ad hoc organizations; 
! Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters and
improvement of joint interoperability across all Army units;
! Force design upon which the future network centric developments
[Future Combat System] can be readily applied;
! Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment
cycle:
! One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active
Component;
! One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve
Force;
! One year deployed and five years at home station for the National
Guard Force; and
! Reduced mobilization times for the Reserve Component as a
whole.3
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4 Torchbearer National Security Report, “The U.S. Army: A Modular Force for the 21st
Century,” The Association of the United States Army (AUSA), March 2005, p. 3.
5 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a battalion consists  of approximately 400 to 1,000 soldiers and
a company consists of 60 to 200 soldiers.
6 Information in this section is taken from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Working
Paper “Army QDR Issue: Can the Overall Combat Output Potential of the Army Be
Increased by Applying Existing Army Organizational Principles in a Different Way?”
September 2005, p. 6. This report was prepared at the request of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense for Program Assessments and Evaluation (OSD(PA&E)) in support of
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2005 discussions. 
7  The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) is a non-profit corporation that administers three
federally funded research and development centers to assist the United States Government
in addressing important national security issues, particularly those requiring scientific and
technical expertise. IDA only works for the government. To avoid institutional pressures to
support Service positions, IDA does not work directly for the military departments. Also,
to ensure freedom from commercial or other potential conflicts of interest, IDA does not
work for private industry.
8  The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will
constitute most of the brigade’s combat and combat support vehicles. The Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (SBCT) concept originated in the 1990s under Army Chief of Staff General
Eric Shinseki as a rapidly deployable, medium weight combat force that could operate
throughout the full spectrum of conflict.
Reported Capability Deficiencies in the Army’s
Modularization Plan
The Army characterizes the Army Modular Force as “more strategically
responsive across the entire range of military operations required by the 21st century
security environment.”4  Some, however, question the design of the Army Modular
Force in terms its ability to successfully conduct counterinsurgency and stabilization
operations.
A Decrease In Maneuver Battalions.  One report suggests that
modularity will decrease the number of actual combat units, in the form of maneuver
battalions,5 Army-wide by 30%.6 According to the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA),7 the Army plans to incorporate only two maneuver battalions into its Heavy
Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs)
(current non-modular, division-based brigades and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
(SBCTs)8 have three maneuver battalions).  The IDA report asserts that this will
reduce the size of the Army’s combat maneuver force. According to IDA, the Total
Army (Active, National Guard, and Reserve) had 233 combat battalions with 699
maneuver companies at the end of FY2004. By the end of 2011, the Army reportedly
plans to have 161 maneuver battalions with 541 maneuver companies — a 30%
reduction in the number of battalions and a 22% reduction in the number of
companies. What concerns some analysts is that the Army is making “a significant
reduction in its total ground maneuver capacity and its ability to control terrain,
CRS-4
9  Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Working Paper “Army QDR Issue: Can the Overall
Combat Output Potential of the Army Be Increased by Applying Existing Army
Organizational Principles in a Different Way?” September 2005, p. 8. 
10 Information in this section is taken from discussions with and briefings from the Army
Staff in December 2005 and February 2006.
11 U.S. Army Staff Paper, “Analysis: IDA Modularity Study,” September 19, 2005.
12 Ibid.
13 “Task Force Modularity: The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force,”
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, July
1, 2005, p. 31.
resources, and people.”9  This reduction in ground maneuver capability — often
referred to as “presence” or “boots on the ground” — may adversely impact the
BCT’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations which often require the ability
to cover large areas with a sufficient number of soldiers to provide security and to
defeat and deter insurgents.
The Army’s View of the IDA Report.10  The Army conducted a detailed
analysis of the IDA report and was severely critical of its findings — suggesting that
IDA employed “faulty assumptions, incomplete and questionable analysis” as well
as a lack of overall understanding of the Army Modular Force program.11  Addressing
IDA’s central criticism — a reduction from three to two maneuver battalions — the
Army  asserts that the modular conversion of brigade combat teams essentially trades
three maneuver battalions (with three companies each) for two maneuver battalions
(with four companies each) plus an armed reconnaissance battalion, equipped with
a variety of technical capabilities and enhancements. The Army further contends that
it made the decision to go with the two maneuver battalion BCT in order to generate
sufficient combat forces for rotational purposes and in recognition of cost constraints
and a need to continue FCS development.12  
The Army suggests that the IDA report employed “Cold War metrics” in its
analysis. By focusing strictly on BCTs, the Army feels that IDA ignored the benefits
of “combat multipliers” such as the modular force’s Armored Reconnaissance
Squadron and its Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Squadrons. In terms of the “boots on the ground” criticism, while IDA counts only
infantry as “boots on the ground” the Army also includes soldiers from company
weapons sections, snipers, dismounted scouts, sappers (specially trained combat
engineers), military police, and assault weapons squads in its “boots on the ground”
equation, which reflects how these soldiers are currently being used in stability and
security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.13
Stabilization Operations.  Another issue is how effective these two
battalion HBCTs and IBCTs will be in conducting stability operations, considered
by many to be manpower-intensive operations. DOD Directive 3000.05, signed on
November 28, 2005 essentially puts the conduct of stability operations on par with
combat operations, which could have implications for HBCTs and IBCTs designed
CRS-5
14 Sergeant Sara Wood, “Directive Boosts Priority of Stability Operations,” American
Forces Press Service, December 14, 2005.
15 Colonel Brian G. Watson, “Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The
Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force,” U.S. Army War College’s
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, August 2005. 
16 Ibid., p. 12. 
17 Ibid.
18  Information in this section is taken from discussions with and briefings from the Army
Staff in December 2005 and February 2006. 
primarily with a combat focus.14 A student research paper from the Army War
College’s Strategic Studies Institute asserts that while the Army’s modular redesign
may be adequate for rapid, decisive combat operations, it is inadequate to conduct
stability operations.15  According to the report, the Army’s current modular force
design fails in three areas:
! It does not provide for a modular and scalable force pool of
stabilization capabilities that can augment the HBCTs and IBCTs;
! It does not provide a multifunctional support brigade capable of
exercising command and control of region-wide stabilization
operations — a capability needed in order to free BCTs of this
responsibility so that they can better perform combat operations if
required, and;
! It does not generate an adequate mix of active and reserve modular
components needed to for stabilization operations as envisioned in
future land campaigns.16
The report’s author suggests that the Army’s new modular Combat Support
Brigades (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB(ME)) would be a suitable candidate to
command region-wide stabilization efforts and provide BCTs with specific
stabilization support.17  Of critical concern is  that the Army’s plan to have only three
CSB(MEs) in the Active force could significantly degrade the ability to surge
stabilization efforts early in a conflict as well as to sustain those efforts over an
extended period.  The report also suggests that the Army must modernize and
reorganize its combat support and service support forces at echelons above the BCT
into a force pool of modular stabilization capabilities.  The Army, in the past, had
been characterized by some as resistant to the development of specialized formations
to deal specifically with stabilization operations, but now that stability operations
have become an Army mission as important as combat itself, this position might no
longer be a practical one.
Stabilization Operations and the Modular Force Construct.18  The
Army appears generally supportive of the Army War College research paper’s
criticisms and recommendations, noting that some of the paper’s recommendations
would be applied to future CSB (ME) development.  However, the Army contends
that the current modular forces construct [that BCTs are full spectrum forces, equally
CRS-6
19 Information in this section is from The Army Campaign Plan, Change 2, Unclassified,
September 30, 2005.
20 Ibid.
21 2005 Army Modernization Plan, Feb. 2005, p. 5.
22 From discussions during the Eisenhower Series Conference, “The United States Army in
Asia: Legacies of the Past, Current Challenges, and Prospects for the Future,” Mar. 31,
2005, Alexandria, Virginia and Lisa Troshinsky, “Official: Army Could Decide by 2007 to
Permanently Boost End Strength,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Apr. 12, 2005.
capable of performing traditional combat, counterinsurgency, and stability
operations] is more than adequate to address the demands of stability operations,
asserting that  the modular force, as designed, has vastly improved communications
infrastructure that permits it to operate in a Joint, Interagency, and Multinational
(JIM) environment.  The Army also asserts that Army modular forces deployed to
Iraq and Afghanistan in comparison to non-modular brigades, have proven to be
equally as effective in conducting combat missions, more capable in conducting
stability operations, and far better at interacting with other Service’s forces.
Modular Conversions in FY200519
In FY2005, the Army converted five Active units to BCTs - three Heavy
Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs); one Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT); and
one Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) — a process that takes 9 to 11 months
for HBCTs and IBCTs and about 18 months for a SBCT. In FY2005, the Army
National Guard started to convert seven units to BCTs - 3 HBCTs; 3 IBCTs; and 1
SBCT — a process that takes about three years to complete. 
The Modular Army FY2006 and Beyond
Modularization Plans FY2006-FY2007
In FY2006, the Army plans to convert 18 brigades into the modular
configuration — 11 in the Active Component and seven in the Army National Guard
— and activate three new BCTs in the Active Component.20 
According to the 2005 Army Modernization Plan, dated February 2005, the
Army will decide in FY2006 whether or not to add five additional BCTs to the
Active component, possibly resulting in 48 Active Component BCTs.21  According
to a number of sources, the Army decided internally as far back FY2005 not to add
the additional five BCTs in FY2007 due to anticipated personnel and funding
shortages.22
If the Army has already decided not to add these five BCTs, then the Active
Army could consist of 43 BCTs by FY2007 - up from 33 maneuver brigades in 2004
under the old divisional system.  The Army’s most current modernization and
campaign plans call for the modular conversion of over 300 Active and National
Guard and Army Reserve (Army Reserve units will only convert to Support
CRS-7
23  Information in this section is taken from discussions with and briefings from the Army
Staff in December 2005 and February 2006.
24 Ibid.
25 U.S. Army Briefing, Modular Forces Overview, Jan. 19, 2005 and September 21, 2005
Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Decision on “Naming Conventions for Army Modular
Forces.”
Brigades) combat, support, and headquarters units by the end of FY2012. 23 The
Army acknowledges that it is possible that some National Guard and Army Reserve
units may not be fully modularized due to equipment and budget constraints, but the
Army suggests that if this becomes the case, it is within acceptable and agreed upon
risk criteria.
National Guard Modularization24
The Army National Guard initiated its modular conversion efforts with the
organizational restructuring of one division headquarters and seven BCTs in FY2005.
In 2005, the Army planned to inactivate four Army National Guard (ANG) brigades
and then convert eight ANG division headquarters and 34 brigades to BCTs from
2005 to 2011.  In mid-2005, the Army revised its plan and now  plans to inactivate
10 ANG brigades and inactivate two ANG division headquarters and then modularly
convert 28 ANG brigades and six ANG headquarters from 2005 to 2011. These
changes were driven by a combination of personnel, equipment, and funding
shortfalls.
The Army has acknowledged that the National Guard will be subject to the same
personnel, equipment, and budgetary influences that will likely impact Active
Component conversion. Furthermore, the Army notes that complete National Guard
modularization costs extend beyond the current program, which could present the
Army with even more difficulties in the later years of the modularization process.
Support Unit Modularization
In 2005, the Army defined the roles, designs and numbers of support brigades
to be developed. The modular support brigades consist of both single function and
multi-functional designs.  The Army reports that by late 2007 or early 2008, that the
majority of BCTs, support brigades, and headquarters that will deploy for the Global
War on Terror operations will be modularly configured. Analysts suggest that once
this occurs, the Army will then be able to gain a better appreciation of the capabilities
and performance of its modular force.  The Army’s Modular Support Brigades
include25
! Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB):  Consisting of between 2,600 to
2,700 personnel and a variety of Army aviation assets;
! Fires Brigade: Consisting of between 1,200 and 1,300 personnel, the
Fires Brigade is to have a mix of cannon, rocket, and missile artillery
CRS-8
systems and is to be able to employ Joint fires (Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force) as well;
! Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB (ME)):
Consisting of 435 personnel, the CSB (ME) is to have engineer,
military police, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense,
and air defense units assigned to it.  In addition, the brigade could
also have  explosive ordnance disposal and civil affairs units
assigned to it;
! Battlefield Surveillance Brigade:  Consisting of 997 personnel, the
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade is to consist of an intelligence
battalion, support troops, and a long-range surveillance detachment.
In addition, the brigade can be augmented with special forces units
as well as additional unmanned aerial vehicles; and
! Sustainment Brigade:  Consisting of 487 personnel, the Sustainment
Brigade is to have medical, finance, human resources, ammunition,
transportation, maintenance, and supply and service units.
The Army currently plans to field the following numbers of Active, National
Guard, and Reserve modular support brigades as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1.  Numbers of Modular Support Brigades 
Type of Support Unit Active
National
Guard Reserve Totals
Combat Aviation Brigade 11 7 0  18 
Fires Brigade 5 7 0 12 
Combat Support Maneuver
Enhancement Brigade
3 14 2  19 
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade 3 2 0  5
Sustainment Brigade 13 9 8  30 
Total 35 39 10 84
Source:  U.S. Army, “The Operational Army Over Time (AC/RC Side),” October 25, 2005 and
Brigade-Based Army Slide as of January 31, 2006.
Cost Considerations
FY2006 Budget
Based on a reported agreement with the Administration, the Army did not
include a modularity budget request for  funds in its FY2006 Presidential Budget
Request and instead will rely on an anticipated DOD FY2006 Supplemental Request
CRS-9
26 Program Budget Decision 753, Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 23, 2004,
pp. 1-6.
27 Gopal Ratnam, “Modular Brigade Supplements to End,” Army Times, December 12, 2005.
28  The Senate, in S.Rept. 109-52 on the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental, cautions DOD
and the Army that “The Department has now had ample time to incorporate requirements
to support Modularity into its annual budget requests.  The Committee is unlikely to regard
supplemental appropriations as an appropriate vehicle for future efforts supporting
modularity,” April 6, 2005, pp. 33-34.   
29  Information in this section is taken from discussions with and briefings from the Army
Staff in December 2005 and February 2006.
to fund modularization. In the FY2005  DOD Supplemental Request, the Army was
given $5 billion for modularization in the budget categories shown in Table 2.





Operations and Maintenance 24.8




Procurement of Equipment and Weapons 4711.2
Total 5,000.0
Source:  Information in this table is taken from the Department of Defense FY2005 Supplemental
Request, Ch. 1:  Force Restructuring, Detailed Justification, Feb. 2005, p. 11.
In December 2004, the DOD Program Budget Decision  No. 753 (PBD 753)
directed the Army to “submit its Modularity requirements for FY2005 and FY2006
in supplemental requests” and provides $ 5 billion per year from FY2007 to FY2011
for modularity, and directs the Army to find $1.5 billion per year in FY2006 to
FY2008 from reengineering its business practices to be applied to Army
modularization.26  While PBD 753 called for modularity to be paid out of
supplements only in FY2005 and FY2006, some speculate that Army modularity will
continue to seek to be funded from supplemental requests in FY2007 and FY2008,27
despite  Congressional warnings that modularity should be incorporated into annual
budget requests28. The Army contends, however, that the Army Modular Force
Change Proposal, approved in December 2005, shifted all modular conversion costs
into the baseline budget starting in FY2007.29
FY2007 Budget
It is not known if the Army will request funds for modularization for FY2007
under the regular defense budgeting process or if it will continue to rely on
CRS-10
30 Gopal Ratnam, “Modular Brigade Supplements to End,” Army Times, December 12, 2005
and Jen DiMascio, “Army Cuts Modernization for Modularity,” Inside Defense, December
14, 2005. 
31 Ibid.
32 Information in this section is taken from GAO Report, GAO-05-926, Force Structure:
Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a
Modular Force, September 2005.
33  Information in this section is taken from discussions with and briefings from the Army
Staff in December 2005 and February 2006.
emergency wartime supplemental appropriations as some reports suggest.30 An Army
Program Budget Decision (PBD), PBD 701, obtained by the press is said to suggest
that the Army will rely on supplementals in FY2007 and FY2008 and then regularly
budget approximately $1.3 billion annually from FY2009 to FY2011 for
modularization.31 
The Army’s FY2007 budget request is due to Congress in February, 2006.
Modularity Cost Estimates32
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), modularity costs
are “substantial and likely to grow.”  Army cost estimates have increased
significantly since January 2004 when the Army estimated that it would cost $20
billion from FY2004-FY2011  to increase the number of active Army brigade combat
teams from 33 to 48. According to GAO in July 2004, the Army added $ 8 billion to
reorganize the reserve component — bringing the estimated cost for the entire force
to $28 billion.
In March 2005, the Army revised their estimate and now reportedly estimates
that modularity will cost at total of $ 48 billion from FY2005-FY2011 — a 71%
increase over the earlier $28 billion estimate. This estimate does not, however,
include an additional $27.5 billion in personnel and constructions costs identified by
GAO, potentially bringing the total estimated cost of modularity to $75.5 billion.
The Army disputes GAO’s $48 billion figure, suggesting instead that the figure
is only $ 43 billion.33 The Army contends that the additional $ 5 billion included in
GAO’s figure includes personnel and unit and equipment reset costs not associated
with the modularity program. In terms of the additional $27.5 billion, the Army
asserts that the construction costs associated with this figure are not modularity
related but instead related the DOD’s Global Basing Strategy and the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. The disparity between GAO and Army
figures is likely a function of the extent and complexity of the Army’s modular
reorganization and the well-documented difficulties of DOD cost accounting
practices and procedures. 
According to the GAO report, the Army anticipates funding the $75.5 billion
cost for modularity with $10 billion in supplemental appropriations, $42.5 billion
through the regular defense appropriation process - including $ 4.5 billion achieved
through efficiencies, and a GAO-estimated $23 billion through either additional
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supplemental or regular appropriations to pay for personnel expenses.  GAO appears
skeptical that the Army will be able to produce $4.5 billion through business process
reengineering, noting that, historically, DOD has had difficulty achieving these
efficiencies.
GAO asserts that given the degree of uncertainty in the Army’s modularity cost
estimates, the reliance on difficult to achieve business reengineering efficiencies, and
the likely cost growth from another high-cost program — the Future Combat System
 — that the Army’s modularity program is at risk of becoming unaffordable.    
Modularity Versus the Future Combat System (FCS)34
A number of reports suggest that the Army is prepared to reduce the number of
planned Active and Guard BCTs in order to protect funding for the FCS program.35
While military officials maintain that no decisions regarding unit cuts have been
finalized, anonymous defense officials have discussed the possibility of eliminating
at least one Active BCT and from three to six Guard BCTs in order to keep the FCS
program on track.  Notwithstanding FCS funding, some Army officials maintain that
budgetary pressures might possibly force the Army to “stop Active Army
modularization at 39 brigades”36 instead of the 43 Active BCTs currently planned for
by the Army. Recent discussions with Army officials suggest that Army
modularization could stop at 36 BCTs — resulting in a gain of only 3 more brigade-
sized units over the 33 Active Component brigades in FY2003 before the Army
launched its modularity  program. Such reductions, particularly in the National
Guard, could potentially meet with significant opposition from Congress, which has
in recent years, overridden DOD by increasing the authorized size of U.S. ground
forces.
While the likely reduction of at least one Active BCT would likely generate
controversy, some analysts believe that the reduction of between three to six National
Guard BCTs could result in significant political opposition. According to reports, the
elimination of six Guard BCTs — approximately 26,000 troops — would likely
consist of eliminating two division headquarters, one aviation brigade, and five
BCTs. Under such a plan, the National Guard would be held to 28 BCTs as opposed
to the 34 Guard BCTs originally planned for by the Army.  According to Lieutenant
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General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, such a major reduction
in Guard forces would “amount to a significant loss of capability for the Guard both
for its domestic responsibilities and in support of its overseas missions.”37 Some
suggest  that the reduction of six Guard BCTs would likely make the Army’s stated
goal of one year deployed and five years at home station for  National Guard forces
extremely difficult to achieve.
The Army’s Position.38 The Army asserts that recent reports on the National
Guard cuts and the possible impact on rotations are misleading. According to Army
officials, the National Guard will inactivate six BCTs, two divisional headquarters,
and one aviation brigade and offset those losses by activating four additional Combat
Support Brigades (Maneuver Enhancement) and three Engineer Brigades. The Army
also maintains that the reduction of six National Guard BCTs would not have a
significant impact on its goal of one year deployed and five years at home station for
National Guard forces. According to the Army, the reduction of six BCTs would only
result in the loss of one BCT available to the deployable force pool per year. Even
at a high operational tempo (comparable to  National Guard deployments during the
height of operations in Iraq)  this would result in deployed units having to extend
their deployment by one month to cover this one brigade-per cycle shortfall. 
Non-Budgetary Issues Affecting Modularization
Personnel Issues
In  testimony to Congress, GAO suggested that its preliminary work indicated
that there were “significant shortfalls in the Army’s capacity to equip and staff
units.”39  While specific information on personnel shortages in terms of rank, military
occupational specialities, and numbers have not been made public by the Army, GAO
reports that modular BCTs will require additional truck drivers, civil affairs
specialists, and military police, and that military intelligence specialists particularly
were a critical shortage.40  The Army has reportedly stated that it would require an
additional 2,800 military intelligence specialists by the end of FY2005 to meet
near-term shortages and an additional 6,200 by 2010 to meet modularity
requirements.41 It is not known if the Army was able to meet its FY2005 year-end
requirements for military intelligence specialists and other military specialities
needed to man BCTs and modular support brigades, but if the Army does decide to
cut one or more active BCTs, these unit cuts could  make it easier for the Army to
fully man its remaining BCTs and support units. 
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Recruiting and Retention.  Significant enlisted personnel shortages that
some had predicted early in FY2005 did not occur, primarily due to a reported 68.3%
retention rate which helped to offset recruiting shortfalls.42  In FY2005, the Army
missed its active duty recruiting target by 6,627 but exceeded its retention goal by
5,350 soldiers.43 While the Army met its recruiting goals for October 2005 (the first
month of FY2006) a reported 12% of October’s enlistees scored in the lowest
category of the military entrance tests on science, math, and word knowledge - a
statistic that some say suggests that the Army might be lowering its entrance
standards to sign up more recruits.44 In FY2005, the Army’s active duty officer
retention returned to its historical averages, indicating that there was no “mass
exodus” of junior company-grade officers as some had predicted.45  Given these
circumstances, its is reasonable to assume, while the Army will continue to
experience recruiting difficulties in FY2006, that catastrophic personnel shortfalls
will not likely occur and that the Army should be able to continue develop its
modular force, although shortages will likely continue to exist in selected high-
demand occupation fields.
Possible Limitations of Female Soldiers in Forward Support
Companies.  Reports concerning female soldiers in BCT Forward Support
Companies (FSC),  focused on the issue of women in combat, suggest that there may
be “insufficient male soldiers in the inventory to fill forward support companies and
that the pool of available male recruits may be too small to sustain the force.”46  FSCs
are intended to collocate with and provide maintenance and logistic support to BCT
combat battalions which, according to some, is a change to the Army’s 1994 policy
which not only banned women from units that engage in direct ground combat such
as infantry and armor but also excluded women “from assignments below brigade
level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.”47
During the first session of the 109th Congress, efforts to legislate the Army’s
1994 position keeping women out of direct combat — specifically, the
Hunter/McHugh Amendment to the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1815)
— were opposed on the grounds that the nature of combat in Iraq already exposed
women to combat and that such an exclusion would be discriminatory against women
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who comprise approximately 14% of the active Army and 6% of the Marine Corps.48
In response to this opposition, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan
Hunter proposed a less contentious amendment that would instead require DOD to
notify Congress 60 days in advance of implementing any changes to the Army’s 1994
policy on assigning women to operational ground units. Although this measure was
initially approved by the House, it did not make it into the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163).  Some assert that even though congressional
restrictions on women in combat did not make it into legislation, that Congress has
essentially sent DOD a “message” that it would take a dim view of DOD efforts to
modify the Army’s 1994 policy on assigning women to units that could be involved
in direct combat.  
Equipment Issues
As previously stated, the Army is also faced with equipment shortages as it
implements its modularity program. According to GAO, modular brigade combat
teams will “require significant increases in the levels of equipment, particularly
command, control, and communications equipment; wheeled vehicles; and artillery
and mortars.”49  Command, control, and communications equipment are of particular
concern as they constitute what the Army considers the key enablers for the modular
brigade combat teams. 
These equipment shortages could be significantly exacerbated by the Army’s
planning assumption that equipment from ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan “would remain in operational condition for redistribution to new and
restructured modular units.”50 Reports, such as the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO’s) April 2005 report on increased usage of military equipment in ongoing
operations and the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) October 2005 report on
resetting the force,51 suggest that equipment is being worn out at significantly higher
rates than expected, asserting that deploying and using equipment in theater for one
calendar year results in five years of wear and tear on that equipment. According to
AUSA, the Army replaced over 800 major systems — ranging from helicopters,
tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles to Stryker and tactical wheeled vehicles — in
FY2005 due to both battle losses and equipment “wash outs” where equipment is
deemed unusable due to excessive wear and tear and damage. According to Army
officials, this excessive usage and loss of equipment has accounted for as much as
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50% of Army modular equipment costs covered under previous wartime emergency
supplementals52.  It is not known if the Army anticipated such a significant loss of
equipment in its plans to equip its modular forces, but it is possible that these higher
than expected losses have resulted in equipment shortages in BCTs and other units
undergoing modular transition.
GAO visits to the 3rd Infantry Division (the first Army unit to undergo modular
reconfiguration) and the 101st Airborne Division (the Army’s second modular unit)
suggest that equipment shortages may also have a detrimental impact on unit training.
Regarding command, control, and communications equipment, both units reportedly
expressed concern that because of these shortages their soldiers might not be able to
achieve proficiency “with some of this high-tech equipment because the equipment
is not available in sufficient numbers.”  In addition, the GAO report noted that both
units were significantly short of their authorizations of tactical unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs).53
Equipment shortages in the 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions — the first
two Army divisions to undergo modularization — raises additional issues for
consideration. One concern is that if the Army’s first two divisions to undergo
modularization could not be fully or even adequately equipped for training, what
implications does that hold for the Army’s eight other active combat divisions that
are scheduled for modularization?  Some suggest that it would not be unreasonable
to assume that these other eight divisions will also likely experience equipment
shortages at  levels experienced by the 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne, and perhaps
even greater.  
According to Army officials, that while units at a lower readiness and training
state may not have their full complement of equipment,  units deploying on
operations are deploying with 100% of their authorized equipment, although
sometimes a unit is not brought up to 100% until it “falls in” on equipment left in a
theater of operations by departing units.54  While some analysts claim that this
practice deprives units of their full complement of equipment needed for training —
as well as domestic missions in the case of the National Guard — the Army notes
that a combination of under-resourcing and under-equipping units in the 1990s (the
so-called “Procurement Holiday”); losses through combat and excessive use; and
modularization needs make this practice necessary.
National Guard Equipment Issues.  Another issue concerns National
Guard  modulariztion.  Some maintain that equipment shortages for Guard units
converting to the modular structure could be even more pronounced than those of
active duty units.  The National Guard Bureau Director, Lieutenant General H.
Steven Blum,  reportedly stated that the Army National Guard was already
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“under-equipped and “under-resourced” before the war55 — a condition some suggest
is historical as Guard units traditionally have less and older equipment than their
active duty counterparts.  
This condition is further exacerbated by the fact that many Guard units have
been required to leave their equipment in Iraq for other units, both Active and Guard,
to use.56  In some instances, Guard units left all but their soldier’s individual
equipment in Iraq, which has had a significant impact on those unit’s ability to train
and also to fulfil their state missions, such as disaster relief and homeland defense.
Such extreme shortages might also have a significant impact on Guard units
converting to modular brigade combat teams.
Demands on Army Depots.   Reports suggest that the demands at Army
depots to maintain and repair equipment needed in Iraq and Afghanistan is having a
detrimental effect on the depots ability to provide equipment for modularization.57
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2005 testimony to the House
Subcommittee on Readiness, noted that as a result of the wars “many of the hundreds
of thousands of pieces of equipment that have been used in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan are in need of replacement or repair.”58  According to CBO, the Army’s
trucks are being driven “roughly ten times more miles per year than has been the
average over the past several years; tanks and armored vehicles are being driven at
rates roughly five times those of peacetime; and helicopters flown at roughly twice
peacetime rates.”59  Adding to the problem of excessive equipment utilization is that
equipment and vehicles are also being destroyed as a result of enemy action and in
non-combat related activities such as vehicle accidents.  Army depots are reportedly
confronting four to five times more equipment wear than the Army anticipated and
are said to be experiencing significant stress in not only repairing equipment needed
for Iraq and Afghanistan, but also trying to meet the Army’s modularity demands.60
Given this situation of competing demands on the Army’s industrial base, it is
possible that the equipment shortages resulting from unit reorganization and the creation
of new brigades might be further exacerbated by demands to repair equipment damaged
or worn out by the war.  
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The Army’s Budget Concerns Regarding Equipment.  The Army’s
Campaign Plan assumes that supplemental funding will continue “until the end of the
emergency plus two fiscal years,”61 in order to fund the  repair and reset equipment
returning from deployed operations. Given the somewhat unpredictable nature of
combat losses and equipment usage rates, some Army officials suggest that
supplemental appropriations may be required for more than the planned  “end of
emergency plus two fiscal years.” Army planners suggest that should the planned-for
supplemental appropriations be reduced or eliminated at the conclusion of the
“emergency” that the Army’s equipment situation could rapidly enter a “death spiral”
whereby units could be significantly and perhaps permanently underequipped due to
a lack of funds for repair and reset of equipment.62  
Basing
On July 27, 2005, the Army announced the stationing locations for its active
duty BCTs:63 
Table 3.  Active BCT Stationing Plan
Location Number of BCTs BCT Flagging Designationsa
Ft. Benning, GA 1 BCT 3rd Infantry Division
Ft. Bliss, TX 4 BCTs 1st Armored Division
Ft. Bragg, NC 4 BCTs 82nd Airborne Division
Ft. Campbell, KY 4 BCTs 101st Airborne Division
Ft. Carson, CO 4 BCTs 4th Infantry Division
Ft. Drum, NY 3 BCTs 10th Mountain Division
Ft. Hood, TX 5 BCTs 4 BCTs - 1st Cavalry Division
1 BCT - 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment
Ft. Knox, KY 1 BCT 1st Infantry Division
Ft. Lewis, WA 3 BCTs (Stryker) 2nd Infantry Division
Ft. Polk, LA 1 BCT 10th Mountain Division
Ft. Richardson, AK 1 BCT 25th Infantry Division
Ft. Riley, KS 3 BCTs 1st Infantry Division
Ft. Stewart, GA 3 BCTs 3rd Infantry Division
Ft. Wainwright, AK 1 BCT (Stryker) 25th Infantry Division
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Location Number of BCTs BCT Flagging Designationsa
Schofield Barracks,
HI
2 BCTs (Stryker) 25th Infantry Division
Korea 1 BCT 2nd Infantry Division
Germany 1 BCT (Stryker) 2nd Cavalry Regiment
Italy 1 BCT 173rd Airborne Brigade
Ft. Irwin, CA 1 BCT (-) 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment
a.  Flagging Designations from AUSA Report, “Active Component Division and Brigade Combat
Team Stationing and Flagging Designations,” August 2005.
In September 2005, the Army published its stationing plan for its Active,
National Guard, and Reserve Component BCTs, support brigades, and operational
headquarters in Change 2 to the Army Campaign Plan. The Army does acknowledge
that there have been some minor changes to this plan since it was issued.
Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force and 
Cyclical Readiness
Other Critical Army Initiatives
The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway which have been
described as “critical enablers” in the Army’s brigade-centric reconfiguration:
rebalancing and stabilizing the force and cyclic unit readiness.  These initiatives
involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes and some observers
contend that these initiatives may be more be difficult to achieve than the creation of
modular BCTs and support brigades as they require significant cultural changes for
the entire Army.  
Rebalancing the Force
In what the Army describes as its “most significant restructuring in 50 years,”
the Army is presently converting a number of units deemed less relevant to current
requirements into units more appropriate to the types of operations ongoing in Iraq
and Afghanistan.  This change involves over 100,000 active and reserve personnel
and involves decreasing certain types of units while increasing others as described
in Table 4, below.
CRS-19
64 U.S. Army’s 2005 Posture Statement (Unclassified), Feb. 6, 2005, p. ii.
65  Information in this section is taken from discussions with and briefings from the Army
Staff in December 2005 and February 2006.
66 U.S. Army’s 2005 Posture Statement (Unclassified), Feb. 6, 2005 p. 9.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
Table 4.  Restructuring of Units, FY2004-FY2009
Decrease Increase
26 - Field Artillery Battalions 149 - Military Police Units
10 - Air Defense Battalions 16 - Transportation Units
13 - Engineer Battalions 9 - Petroleum/Water Distribution Units 
19 - Armor Battalions 9 - Civil Affairs Units
65 - Ordnance (Battalions - Teams) 7 - Psychological Operations Units
 — 11 - Biological Integrated Defense Companies
Source:  Torchbearer National Security Report, “The U.S. Army: A Modular Force for the 21st
Century,” The Association of the United States Army (AUSA), March 2005, p. 19.
According the Army’s 2005 Posture Statement dated February 6, 2005 this
rebalancing is underway with more than 34,000 spaces having been converted.64
Army officials state that recommendations from QDR 2005 could possibly alter the
numbers and types of units that will be decremented and increased, but these officials
believe that such changes would likely be minor in nature.65  The Army further
maintains that rebalancing will increase its capabilities sufficiently to relieve the
stress on high demand/low density units.  This rebalancing is also intended to place
more combat support and combat service support units back into the active
component from the Reserves to improve overall deployability and sustainability, as
well as to reduce requirements for immediate mobilization of reserve units.66
Stabilizing the Force
This initiative transitions the Army from an individual replacement manning
system to a unit-focused system. This stabilization initiative is applicable only to
Active Component forces.  The objective is to keep soldiers in units longer in order
to reduce historically high turnover rates of soldiers and their leaders and to foster
unit cohesion and operational effectiveness.67  In addition, this initiative is intended
to provide stability to Army families, and could ultimately save the Army money as
it could result in fewer moves for soldiers and their families. The 172nd Separate
Infantry Brigade in Alaska was the first unit to implement the unit stability program
and four additional brigades began unit stability in 2005.68
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Cyclical Readiness - Army Force Generation69
In FY2006 the Army plans to implement a new readiness system —  modeled
on the cyclical readiness systems of the other Services —  to replace its old “Tiered
Readiness System” which, according to the Army, created a “Haves” and “Haves
Not” culture - with most of the “Haves Not” consisting of Army National Guard and
Reserve units.   Under this readiness system, called the Army Force Generation
Model,  units will move through a structured progression of unit readiness over time
intended to produce predictable periods of availability of trained, ready, and equipped
units available for deployment. Under this model, units will fall into one of three
pools: the reset/retrain pool; the ready pool; and the available pool. In the reset/retrain
pool units will not be  ready or available for major combat operations but could
conduct homeland security and disaster relief operations. Units in the ready pool are
conducting training and receiving additional personnel and equipment to bring them
up to full strength and units in this pool can be deployed to meet “surge
requirements” if need be. After passing the ready pool, units are assigned to the
available pool for one year where they become eligible to deploy for combat and
other operations. The Army hopes to maintain 20 BCTs (14 Active and 6 Reserve)
in the available pool on a continuous basis.
The Army hopes that the Army Force Generation Model for readiness will result
in:
! A steady-state supply of 20 ready, fully-resourced, BCTs and
supporting units;
! Stabilized personnel to join, train, deploy, and fight together in the
same unit;
! Assured and predictable access to National Guard and Reserve units
for operational requirements;
! Better ability to allocate constrained  resources (particularly
equipment) based on unit deployment schedules;
! More predictable unit deployments for soldiers, their families, and
employers; and
! Opportunity to synchronize unit readiness with a wide variety of
Institutional Army requirements such as professional schooling
needed for promotion and military specialty-specific training.  
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Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
How  Many  BCTs Will the Army Field? 
Over the past two years the Army has gone from its originally planned “48 to
43 Active Component  BCTs” to reportedly only “43 Active Component BCTs” to
“42 BCTs” and, according to some Army officials,  perhaps as few 39 or 36 Active
Component BCTs. Analysts suggest that a variety of factors have been involved in
this reduction over time including troop and equipment shortages, budgetary
constraints, as well as the Army’s desire to protect funding for modernization -
namely the Future Combat System. Similar reductions in the Army National Guard
and Reserve have also reportedly occurred.  Army officials also suggest that this
reduction was also in part necessitated out of need to adequately staff and equip
modular support brigades and headquarters after the BCTs had been filled with
required personnel and equipment - often times taken from divisional and higher
level support units and headquarters.70 Given this decreasing number of BCTs,
Congress may wish to explore the circumstances that compelled the Army to
decrease its numbers of BCTs - both active and reserve - as well as what risks are
associated with having a smaller combat force than originally intended.
Modularity “Lessons Learned” From Deployments 
It is possible that Congress might explore with DOD and the Army the initial
“lessons learned” from the 2005 deployment to Iraq of 3rd Infantry Division and the
101st Airborne Division — the Army’s first two modularized divisions. The
performance of these two restructured divisions that participated in the March 2003
ground invasion of Iraq in the traditional divisional structure, will likely be closely
scrutinized and hopefully extensively documented.  The Army has suggested that the
operational and combat lessons learned from the current rotation of these two new
units will help the Army to refine not only tactics and operational procedures for
modular forces, but also force structure as well as unit manning, two areas of
considerable congressional interest.  Congressional exposure to these lessons learned
could potentially provide valuable insight as it performs it’s oversight and budgetary
roles regarding the Army’s transformation to a modular force.
Personnel and Equipment Shortages
Congress may decide to examine the impact of personnel and equipment
shortages on modularization of the active Army and National Guard in greater detail.
Some contend that personnel, in particular, and equipment shortages could result in
the Army not achieving its goals in terms of both timelines for conversion, as well
as total number of additional brigade combat teams and support brigades created.
Such an examination could focus on individual units, and identify not only current
and projected equipment and personnel shortfalls in those units, but perhaps trends
throughout both the active Army and National Guard.  Given the National Guard’s
more pronounced personnel shortfalls and its historic equipment shortages, Congress
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may opt for a much more detailed examination of these shortages as well as the
Army’s overall timeline and possibly unfulfilled budgetary requirements  to fully
convert Guard and Reserve units to a modular force.
Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Operations
Congress might review the adequacy of the Army’s current modular force
structure design in terms of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Concerns
have been raised that the new BCTs will not have as many infantry soldiers as
previous divisional combat brigades and that fewer infantry soldiers could possibly
mean that these new BCTs might not have the ability to exert adequate presence to
provide security as well as to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Another issue
that might be examined is how effective the Army’s current modular force structure
is in addressing the demands of stabilization operations.  While the modular force
may be optimally designed to conduct rapid, decisive combat operations, it may not
have the appropriate command and control formations or the right mix of support
units such as engineers, logistics units, and military police to successfully conduct
stabilization operations.  Recent history suggests that it is no longer sufficient to
simply defeat an adversary on the battlefield and that combat operations must be able
to rapidly and successfully transition to security and stabilization operations in order
to reduce the possibility of an ensuing civil war or insurgency.  Given DOD’s
emphasis on the importance of stabilization operations, Congress might choose to
revisit the Army’s modular force structure to determine if it is properly configured
to conduct stabilization operations.
Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force
Congress might act to review, in greater detail, the Army’s rebalancing and
stabilization initiatives.  The Army has characterized these initiatives as “critical” to
the modular transformation of the Army, but little is publically known as to how well
they are progressing in terms of new units that have been created or how stabilization
is affecting unit cohesion or family life for soldiers.  Given that these two initiatives
involve significant structural and cultural change for the Army, they also likely have
significant budgetary implications that some feel are not adequately discussed as part
of Army modularity.
Cyclical Readiness
Congress may decide to examine the Army’s Force Generation Model of
cyclical readiness in greater detail. This new model - a departure from the long-
standing tiered readiness system - will supposedly provide the Army with a trained
and ready force pool of 20 active and reserve BCTs at all times. Such a change will
likely have a significant impact on how the active and reserve Army staffs, equips,
and trains its units and will almost certainly have budgetary and resource implications
that Congress might decide to review. 
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